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INTRODUCTION (Jon Bialecki) 
 
The Scottish Enlightenment is justly famous for upending fields as diverse as medicine, 
economics, and philosophy—not to mention anthropology. But perhaps the greatest legacy of 
this intellectual awakening is the effect that one of its least known luminaries had on the 
seemingly inconsequential field of geology. In 1785, to an astounded gathering of the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh, James Hutton gave two lectures that were subsequently published as A 
Theory of the Earth (Hutton 1788). Hutton’s radical thesis was that the Earth’s form had not 
remained unchanged since the seven days of Creation, and that the planet’s topography was 
not the result of a singular catastrophic universal deluge or primary ocean. Rather, Hutton 
argued that the shape of the earth was the result of processes of constant but infinitesimally 
slow transformation. Hutton’s claim was that erosion and volcanic uplift constantly worked 
together to remake the surface of the earth anew. This process, though, was so slow that it 
could only be inferred, occurring at the scale of not hundreds or thousands, but rather 
millions of years.  Hutton’s conclusion was encapsulated in the famous final sentence of the 
paper where he first presented this argument: ‘The result of our present enquiry is that we 
find no vestige of a beginning, no prospect of an end’.  
 Hutton’s claim has accorded him the honour of being the founder of modern geology, 
as it states on the gravesite memorial to James Hutton that can be found in Greyfriars 




University of Edinburgh. Hutton’s theory accomplished more than that, however. It was also 
pivotal in laying the groundwork for the development of the theory of evolution. When 
Darwin toured the world in the H.M.S. Beagle as the ship’s naturalist, he brought with him 
all the then-extant volumes of Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830); Lyell’s book 
was a full-throated defense of Hutton’s then still controversial geological theory. It was 
Lyell’s book, credited in Darwin’s On the Origins of Species, that opened Darwin’s eyes to 
the vistas of time that he felt was necessary for natural selection to function as a means of 
speciation.  
 Hutton’s work is therefore at once humanist and corrosive of any easy humanism. On 
the one hand it champions human rationality as it presents our species as having a unique 
capacity, discipline, and command of natural forces to deduce formative  processes otherwise 
obscured through the passage of time (‘This subject is important to the human race, to the 
possessor of this world, to the intelligent being Man, who foresees events to come, and who, 
in contemplating his future interest, is led to enquire concerning causes, in order that he may 
judge of events in which otherwise he could not know’ (Hutton 1788:214)). At the same time, 
the suggestion of ancient pre-human eras challenges the concept of the human as a privileged 
species.. Not only does these vistas of time open the way for the ‘cosmic outsideness’ that 
terrified the American author H.P. Lovecraft, and haunts much of contemporary post-
humanism (see Thacker 2011: 19-20). The stretches of long pre-human eons implicit in 
Hutton’s theory also eats away at the Kantian vision of human subjectivity that has been so 
influential to much of Euro-American modernity. Immemorial time taxes the epistemological 
conceit that (putting aesthetics aside) though we are walled off from the way objects are in 
and of themselves, we can know them as they exist for ‘for us.’ Here, we have long-lost 
forces that are indifferent to the much latter development of humanity. There is no ‘for us’ to 




 When viewed from a strictly anthropological perspective, though, what is most 
striking is the way that Hutton’s work at once reinforces one of the most foundational, and 
now problematic, oppositions in anthropology, and yet at the same time undoes  that binary. 
Hutton’s positing of an earth with unimaginably ancient beginnings helps validate a 
nature/culture dichotomy; if human history is just a slim swath of unimaginably vaster and 
more numerous ages, then it becomes possible to imagine a nature without a culture, a move 
which in turns suggest culture as something not identical to, or automatically following from, 
the natural order.  At the same time, as the anthropologist Richard Irvine (2014a, 2014b) has 
recently suggested, Hutton’s hypothesis in some ways is necessary for the Anthropocene to 
be conceivable in the first place. The human features and effects that constitutes the 
Anthropocene can only be truly visible when juxtaposed against a background of extended 
ages first charted in the West by Hutton. Thus, Hutton’s work catalyses our conceiving of 
that most profound of nature-culture hybrids: an age forged, and perhaps destroyed, by Homo 
Sapiens Sapiens.  
 There is one more point that follows, though, when we juxtapose James Hutton and 
the Anthropocene. The apocalyptic anxieties that almost always arrive with the idea of the 
Anthropocene suggests that Hutton’s claim that there is ‘no beginning,’ may hold up much 
better than his presumption of there being ‘no prospect for an end’. Indeed, Hutton’s 
Uniformitarianism, set up in opposition to Biblically dependent diluvian accounts of 
geological formation, may have blinded us to Catastrophism-leaning arguments regarding 
terrestrial or cosmological forces that could interrupt the Anthropocene - or which the 
Anthropocene may unknowingly unleash.  
 Thus, the quality and magnitude of the forces that we are playing with during the 
Anthropocene as a world-historical fact may exceed the capacity of the Anthropocene as a 




launched against it, the nature/culture opposition may still have much to offer. It was these 
sets of concerns that contextualized the original plenary session at the ASA Decennial 
Conference in 2014 (convened by myself, Magnus Course, and Jamie Cross), and that was 
the precursor of  this rendition of that session by Nigel Clark and Rupert Stasch. Nigel Clark, 
whose institutional home is at the Environment Centre of Lancaster University, is a 
sociologist by training but a geographer by profession, and has written not only on the 
vulnerabilities of human social and political forms to natural forces, but also on the forms of 
collective human responses that those overwhelming terrestrial and cosmological forces may 
trigger. Rupert Stasch is a Cambridge socio-cultural anthropologist. He works on the 
Korowai of West Papua; in particular, on the role that the Korowai play in a media- and 
tourism-enflamed Western imaginary that is searching for a stabilising ‘primitive’ other: a 
living specimen of the long-running Occidental fantasy of humanity in some originary natural 
state. Given the way that their collective works not only straddle both sides of the 
nature/culture divide but also play with the generative differential forces expressed through 
and created by that divide, we (Course, Cross and myself) turned to them at the ASA 
conference as we do here with a simple, heartfelt anthropological request: Either because of, 
or despite of, all that is on the table when we conjure with the concept of the anthropocene, 
should we not also make use of the conceptual apparatus central not just to a prior 
anthropology, but to an Enlightenment mode of Western thought? In short, ‘Can we have our 
nature/culture dichotomy back, please?’  
 
PART ONE (Nigel Clark) 
 





What planet are you on?  
Long ago, in another hemisphere, perhaps even in a bygone geological epoch, I discovered 
the later writings of cultural theorist Raymond Williams.  What drew me to Williams was his 
willingness, rare in the late 1970s, to fuse ecological thinking with radical social politics. ‘‘In 
this actual world there is … not much point in counterposing or restating the great 
abstractions of Man and Nature’, he wrote. ‘‘We have mixed our labour with the earth, our 
forces with its forces too deeply to be able to draw back and separate either out’ (1980: 83).  
 These words have since been copiously cited by critical social thinkers to support 
claims that the great modern binary - nature/culture and its variants - needed to be thoroughly 
undone.  There are, at very least, several related factors motivating this task.  One, perhaps 
Williams’ prime aim, is to the avert the tendency, familiar in the western tradition, of 
conservative political forces evoking the referential force of nature in order to delegitimate 
undesired social change.  Another is to prompt us to come to terms with the historical impact 
of social processes on the environment, especially valuable for problematising the idea of 
wilderness and all its occlusions of the agency of non-western peoples. A third is to undercut 
human exceptionalism and encourage us to take our place in the cosmos amidst a world of 
other beings and entities.    
 These are all imperatives I happily affirm. But has the project of effacing the 
nature/culture dichotomy become too routine, too strident, too totalising?   As social theorist 
Vicki Kirby cogently asks: ‘Why has the critique of binaries been turned into a moral witch-
hunt, as if oppositional logic is an error to be corrected?’ (1999: 27-8).  Without dismissing 
the practice of deconstructing dualistic thinking, Kirby argues that too hastily dismantled 
dichotomies have a habit of circling back and reinsinuating themselves in the very critical 
practices doing the demolition work. Moreover, she insists, making cuts or distinctions is not 




productive process. Or rather, it is productivity, the very means by which processes of 
differentiation take place and are sustained (Kirby 1999: 28).   
 With this in mind, I want to take the current ‘geologic predicament’ of our species as 
an incitement to reconsider the nature/culture dualism - and question some of the prevailing 
modes of overcoming it.  And then, in the context of a shifting and divisive Earth, I will 
return to Kirby’s provocations.  
 First, back to Williams.  Just a few pages on from his influential encounter with the 
human/nature antinomy comes another prompt, much less cited.  Williams calls upon his 
audience to ‘‘to re-emphasize, as a fundamental materialism, the inherent physical conditions 
– a specific universe, a specific planet, a specific evolution, specific physical lives – from 
which all labour and all consciousness must take their origins’ (1980: 108). The implications 
of this passage seem rather different from the first, and in the context of current planetary 
conditions, even more prescient.   
 It is noteworthy that Williams was writing not only in the midst of unfolding 
environmental problems, but just behind a wave of momentous changes in the Earth sciences.  
As historian John Brooke (2014: 25-28) reminds us, the years 1966-73 alone saw the 
emergence of four major new perspectives on the shaping of our planet.  First came the 
confirmation of the theory of plate tectonics – the basis of a truly integrated view of the 
Earth’s crustal dynamics.  Soon after came the thesis that evolution is punctuated by 
catastrophic bursts linked to major geophysical events, followed by a new appreciation of the 
role of extra-terrestrial impacts in shaping Earth history, and finally, the beginnings of the 
idea the major sub-components of the Earth work in collusion - as expressed in the Gaia 
hypothesis and Earth systems theory (see Clark and Gunaratnam 2016).  
 Though quite a few dualisms or divisions in received ways of thinking about our 




developments - and the successive transformations in the Earth and life sciences that they 
unleashed – have impacted on the social sciences and humanities.  Until very recently 
Williams’ summoning of fellow critical thinkers to attend to ‘a specific planet’ has gone 
largely answered. And that’s unfortunate, given that these literally ‘earth-shattering’ shifts in 
the scientific understanding of planetary dynamics do the groundwork for the major 
geophysical challenges of recent years; the abrupt climate change thesis and the more 
generalised idea of human-induced Earth system change - shorthanded in the notion of the 
Anthropocene.  
 The Anthropocene idea may foreground human agency, but it depends on an 
understanding of an Earth bursting with instabilities of its own. Bringing together an older 
stratigraphic geology with a newer Earth system science, the thesis hinges on a novel 
understanding of the way that the planet’s relatively slow moving lithic crust articulates with 
the more mobile spheres of water, air, ice and life.  It is the interaction of these subsystems 
that give rise to an Earth system with multiple possible operating states - with the disturbing 
possibility of being able to flip rapidly from one regime to another.  And with this folding 
together of the temporalities and dynamics of the geophysical Earth and time-spaces of social 
life, the question of what planet we are on erupts into social thought.  
 In interesting ways, the Anthropocene reveals the currency of Williams’ call both to 
relinquish human/nature dichotomies and to acknowledge the deep planetary prehistory of the 
human.  But so too does it throw into relief the tension between these two imperatives.  Over 
the intervening years, it is the demand to discompose the society/nature opposition that has 
prevailed in critical social thought - most notably in a range of ‘relational materialisms’ that 
attribute agency to all manner of things and insist on the co-enactment of the social and the 
natural (Clark, 2011: 30-4). Such ontological privileging of mutual or co-constitutive modes 




the complex, messy realities we inhabit.  In other words, it is potentially within our grasp to 
collectively recompose the worlds we share with other beings or entities precisely because we 
are always already in relations with them.    
 The idea of a specific universe, planet and evolution as the origin of our social being 
has very different implications - for it draws us into domains that are before, beneath or 
beyond the human presence.  In these regions or worlds there may well be all manner of 
entanglements and co-productions– but they do not involve ‘us’.  To put it crudely, there is 
‘nature’ but not what we would recognise as ‘culture’ or ‘society’.  
 The tension between nature-society co-enactment and fully inhuman worlds or forces, 
I want to suggest, is not only to be found Williams’ work or in recent critical engagements 
with the Anthropocene.  It has roots reaching deep into the European Enlightenment, and 
especially into the emergent geological imaginaries of the latter 18th century. For here, in 
early encounters with the deep temporal rumbling of the Earth, are profound premonitions of 
the geological anxieties of own era. 
 
Enlightenment geotrauma 
When Williams or any of our contemporaries speak of human-nature co-production, they are 
channelling a lengthy tradition of critical concern with the social transformation of the natural 
world and the self- or societal transformation seen to be its corollary. As Marx and Engels 
observed in the German Ideology:  ‘the nature that preceded human history ... is nature which 
today no longer exists anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral-islands of recent 
origin)’ (2004 [1845]: 63).  If Marx carries forward the Enlightenment vision of the human 
capacity to improve upon the natural world, so too does he inherit the 18th century concern 
with the planet’s inhuman origins.   At high school, the young Marx had been tutored by 




(Laudan, 1987: 94-5).  It is from Werner that we get the basic stratigraphic notion of 
successive ‘‘rock formations’ distinguished by the time and mode by which they were formed 
– the most likely inspiration for Marx’s own notion of social formations.  
 But when Marx later observes that ‘the processes by which the earth made the 
transition from a liquid sea of fire and vapour to its present form now lie beyond its life as 
finished earth’ ((1973 [1857]: 460), he seems a little hasty to consign the formative action to 
the past.  This seems to reflect the influence of Hegel.   Like many contemporary philosophes 
Hegel was a keen follower of developments in the study of the Earth.  Which meant, like 
Kant before him, that he had to grapple with the experience of deep time, the dramatic 
opening up of Earth history from a biblically-sanctioned few millennia to a yawning, 
hundreds of millions of years (see Irvine, 2014).  As palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould aptly 
observes, when Freud recounted the successive ‘humiliating’ decentrings of a self-important 
humanity, he neglected perhaps the greatest: the 18th century discovery of a protracted Earth 
history largely devoid of human presence (1987: 1-3).  The deepest shock, however, may not 
have been the expanding time span nor even the radical absence of humans, but the 
perturbing manner in which the Earth had come to attain its present state.  
 Support for an extended geo-history came from increasing evidence that layers of the 
Earth’s crust contained fossilised remnants of life forms no longer present in the world.  The 
sense that that transitions between geological epochs were marked by events catastrophic 
enough to expunge entire populations of living creatures found expression in the idea of 
‘revolutions of the Earth’ - a notion Kant and Hegel shared with many late 18th and early 19th 
century geological thinkers.  Kant seems to be one of the first to glimpse the shocking 
implications of such upheavals.  If the Earth has annihilated its own living creations many 




Kant agonized, if the universe lost its one and only thinking being, then  ‘…the whole 
creation would be a mere waste, in vain, and without final purpose’ (2005 [1790]: 219).   
 Kant’s response was to construct an entire edifice of thought in which humankind and 
cosmos were so conceptually bound together that it was next to impossible to imagine one 
without the other:  a system in which gazing at a convulsing nature served as a stimulus to 
strengthen man’s steely will and self-responsibility.  Hegel too, with a later and even darker 
comprehension of the Earth’s susceptibility to ‘tremendous revolutions’ went a step further.  
So world-transforming was humankind’s ascent, he decided, that by definition the Earth’s 
formative tumult must be confined to a long-superseded past.  As Hegel announced in the 
1817 Jena Encylopedia, revolutions of the Earth should must now be considered ancient 
history, and thus of mere academic interest. ‘[T]his temporal  succession of the strata, does 
not explain anything at all’, Hegel insisted:  
 
‘One can have interesting thoughts about the long intervals between 
such revolutions, about the profounder revolutions caused by 
alterations of the earth’s axis, and also those caused by the sea. They 
are, however, hypotheses in the historical field, and this point of view 
of a mere succession in time has no philosophical significance 
whatever’ (1970[1817]: 283).   
 
Henceforth it is humankind that makes history, not the Earth.  Marx seems to have bought 
into this. And so, it seems, has nearly all subsequent social thought. Substitute no social or no 
political significance for no philosophical significance and this seems pretty much where the 




 Much has been said about both the achievements and the pathologies of the European 
Enlightenment.  But perhaps not enough has been made of the era’s deep-seated geological 
anxieties, and the enduring ramifications of strategies to keep ‘geotrauma’ at bay.  In their 
efforts to improve, to accumulate and to power their progressive advance, modernizing 
Europeans burrowed deep into the Earth’s crust.  The deeper they dug, the more evidence 
they unearthed of the planet’s proclivity for life-annihilating upheaval – with its 
accompanying low, rumbling intimation of a future Earth bereft of human presence (Clark, 
2016).  
 Finding ways to defuse the planet’s cataclysmic tendencies may well have been one 
of the master strokes of modern European thought. Effectively what Kant and Hegel each 
managed to do was to find a way to neutralize the fearsome potentiality of a dynamic Earth, 
to contain and disarm the threat that inhuman nature posed to the ascendance of our species.  
As philosopher Quentin Meillassoux (2008) has recently argued, the much mulled-over 
culture/nature duality may well have functioned as a smokescreen - an alibi for avoiding the 
bigger, scarier confrontation with the autonomy and indifference of extra-human nature.  
What Kant succeeded in doing, Meillassoux insists, was not sundering society from nature, 
not partitioning the human from the nonhuman, but binding them into a ‘correlation’. And 
this is our inheritance, he argues, for western social and philosophical thought has continued 
to disavow the idea of a natural world that is in and for itself ever since Kant.   
 If we run with Meillassoux’s framing of correlationism – and my geological 
excavations suggest we should – then questions are raised about commitment to the co-
enactment of the natural and the social as the best forward, about prevailing assumptions that 
the messy reality of nature-culture entanglement is where our full attention ought to be 
focused.  Then again, isn’t co-constitution of humankind and the Earth - our labour and its 




might it mean for our thinking about ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ if we ceased to imagine that the 
fate of the planet and the cosmos was bundled up with our own? 
   
The cosmos after nature/culture  
Treated cautiously, the conceptual framework of society-nature co-constitution seems to me 
to be useful for approaching certain kinds of issue: sociotechnical risk, ecological problems, 
human-animal relations, to name a few. But geophysical events – with their largely inhuman 
forces and timeframes – grate against assumptions of mutuality and co-presence. Which may 
help explain why, until very recently, most research in a relational materialist key has been 
oriented towards technological and biological processes.   
 If the Anthropocene thesis resuscitates the 18th century thematic of life threatening 
‘revolutions of the Earth’, its novel positing of a human trigger for geophysical threshold 
events seems to invite a relational (we might say correlational) reading.  But it is important to 
recall that just as human-induced climate change makes little sense without considering the 
broad sweep of past planetary climatic regimes, so too does an epoch counter-signed by 
Anthropos draw its significance from the context of a great succession of decisively inhuman 
geological periods. Meanwhile, beyond the anthropic flourish, the sun continues to power the 
planetary surface and the Earth’s inner heat incessantly drives convection currents in the 
viscous rock of the mantle and the movement of tectonic plates.  
 So, we might say that the Anthropocene predicament simultaneously intensifies both 
sides of Williams’ equation: it foregrounds the zone of social-natural interplay while 
reminding us that this slender province exists only by consent of the vast, pressing inhuman 
forces all around it (Clark and Gunaratnam 2016). And in this regard, our late 18th- early 19th 
century predecessors had every justification for constructing thought systems to salve our 




paroxysms of the Earth and seeking to construct our own impregnable worlds turns out to 
have greatly exacerbated our vulnerability - as repressive strategies are wont to do.  
 But where else might our deconstructive urges lead us if we recognise that effacing 
nature/society antinomies is not the first or last word – and if we face the fact that this is not a 
cosmos organized for our comfort or our continuity?  Here I want to return to Vicki Kirby’s 
work, and in particular her reflection on whether there is ‘…another way to think the order of 
the nature/culture problematic that doesn’t rush to answer it by repeating the very terms that 
presume it’ (1999: 24).   What Kirby prompts us to ask is the extent to which evoking a 
nonhuman nature that precedes or exceeds the complications of culture is enough to 
dismantle the society/nature binary – or to avoid erecting it in the first place.  For even if we 
attribute the most momentous powers and agencies to the inhuman, have we necessarily freed 
ourselves from imagining that culture – if and when it arrives – brings to the world something 
unique and unprecedented, something unconscionable in ‘raw’ nature? 
 Beyond simply repeating that nature does things even in our absence, Kirby inquires 
what exactly it is about culture or language or subjectivity that we assume belongs to us alone  
- and what it is that stops us from perceiving these qualities in the world at large. Which 
brings her to consider whether ‘what we conventionally call Nature is as actively literate, 
numerate, and inventive as anything we might include within Culture’ (2011: 66).  Moreover, 
Kirby queries, what if nature not only communicates with itself, but questions itself? And 
what if our own probings and interrogations of our planet were to be viewed as somehow 
continuous with ‘the Earth’s own scientific investigations of itself’ (2011: 34).  Finally, and 
coming back to our initial provocation concerning binaries, Kirby then raises the possibility 
that it is not only ourselves who make distinctions, draw lines, impose divisions, but that 
biological phenomena (or geological phenomena, it might be added) make their own cuts, 




 And so, we might wonder, if nature breaches its own integrity – as in the case of an 
Earth that breaks with its own previous operating state – does it also seek to span these 
divides, to reach across its own rifts?  For as poet and writer Anne Michaels muses in the 
novel Fugitive Pieces:  
 
It is no metaphor to witness the astonishing fidelity of minerals 
magnetized, after hundreds of millions of years, pointing to the 
magnetic pole, minerals that have never forgotten magma whose 
cooling off has left then forever desirous …. Perhaps the electron is 
neither particle nor wave but something else instead, much less 
simple – a dissonance – like grief, whose pain is love’ (1997: 53, 
211). 
 
We have wandered some way from the theme of mixing of our labour with the forces of the 
Earth - but once the culture/nature couplet is prised open, there is no telling where it might 
lead.  At very least, we have begun to part company with Kant’s insistence that without us 
‘the whole creation would be a mere waste…without final purpose’. If the idea that the Earth 
and cosmos might spiral on without us – sensate, desirous, self-questioning – is not exactly a 
consolation, it may well offer timely provocations as we face the revolutions of the Earth 
now gathering on the horizon.  
 
 
PART TWO (Rupert Stasch) 
 




In the historical context of the Anthropocene as both a material crisis and a condition of 
consciousness, is the nature/culture distinction obsolete, or helpful? Addressing this question 
requires recognizing that there are many different understandings available of ‘nature,’ of 
‘culture,’ and of the idea of a ‘distinction’ between them. The differences between these 
understandings ought to be clarified as part of any argument affirming or denying a 
nature/culture distinction. In what follows, I will advocate the heuristic anthropological value 
of just one limited version of the nature/culture distinction, before then turning to the 
question of the Anthropocene and how it is illuminated by this specific distinction. 
 
Critiques of Nature and Culture 
Since at least the mid-1970s, there has been a trend in anthropology and allied fields of 
rejecting the nature/culture distinction. One set of important contributions has opened the 
question of cultural variability in whether ‘nature’ is even a widely recognized category in 
world societies. Wagner (1981[1975]), Strathern (1980), Descola (2013), and Viveiros de 
Castro (1998) are among those who have explored this issue. With deep conceptual insight as 
well as extensive ethnographic support, they have concluded that the Enlightenment’s 
nature/culture distinction is peculiar, and not a sound basis for comparative anthropological 
understanding. In my own broader research I see myself as a student and fellow-traveller of 
these authors’ ideas (e.g. Stasch 2009), and a student and partisan of the provincialization of 
the self-styled universalisms of Enlightenment ‘Man’ that these anthropologists’ work 
advances (compare Tsing 2016). I view the specific distinction between nature and culture 
that I propose to rehabilitate here, and the way I propose to use it, as an homage to these 
authors’ contributions, consistent with what they have done, and an attempt at further 




 Latour (1993) carries these anthropologists’ train of reasoning and forms of evidence 
back to the Enlightenment formation itself, to argue that while naturalism is the ideology of 
this formation, it is not even a description of its actual character. Our worlds do not consist of 
nature and culture but of hybrid nature/cultures. And the nonhuman is as laden with forms of 
agency as the human. He takes ecological crises of the Anthropocene as the very model of a 
network or collective, the understanding of which is not helped by the concept of nature 
(Latour 2009). 
 Additionally, a large variety of anthropologists have sought to privilege materiality 
over idea, sign, and category as a site of the cultural (e.g. Gell 1998), or to develop 
understandings of signification and representation that have an internal relation to materiality 
rather than being exogenous to materiality (e.g. Keane 2003; Manning 2012; Hull 2012; Ochs 
2012). Another specific movement has been interest in ‘affect,’ conceptualized as a domain 
of monistic unity between human experience and a wider material cosmos, following Spinoza 
by way of Deleuze, Guattari, and Massumi.  
 In the world or in anthropological research about it, we have also seen the growth in 
prominence of a variety of phenomena that trouble a nature/culture division, such as 
technologically-assisted reproduction; study of biopolitics, or the making of social orders 
centrally through the regulation of biology and population; study of infrastructure; projects of 
non-anthropocentric or post-humanistic study of human-animal and human-machine 
relations; a proportional shift from fieldsites where land features are not overwhelmingly 
anthropogenic in all respects, to fieldsites where they are; study of virtualized or mediatized 
nature, or of locations where the framing of earth features as spectacular nature is plainly 
entangled with human histories; the increasing ambition of kinship studies to unify 
conception, pregnancy, birth, bodilness, and feeling with issues of kinship as categorial and 




people’s understandings of their porous social and subjective interchanges with plants, 
animals, landforms, and divinities. 
 
What Kind of Distinction Would We Want? 
Any nature/culture distinction an anthropologist today might want to utilize would need to 
take on lessons of this work. And so behind the question ‘Can we have our nature/culture 
distinction back?’ is another one: ‘Which nature/culture distinction would we wish to reclaim, 
in light of what we have learned?’ 
 ‘Nature’ means many different things. The element that critics of the nature/culture 
distinction most commonly reject as ethnocentric and ideological, rather than a helpful 
heuristic category in comparative work, is nature as an entity or a place; nature as a system, a 
unity, a field of laws, and a stable hierarchical order; and nature as a resource base externally 
given to human dominion (compare Valeri 1990:264-269). Yet there is a problem of possible 
slippage between rejecting the ‘straw man’ of these most Enlightenment-specific layers of 
what ‘nature’ can mean, and rejecting other layers of what ‘nature’ can mean that might 
better be kept in consideration. 
 It is longstanding anthropological practice to refine our comparative concepts to mean 
what we need them to mean, and thereby to work toward a helpful metalanguage for 
describing and translating how worlds are organized. One of Latour’s own methodological 
concepts is ‘infra-language,’ by which he means analytic language of minimal semantic 
specificity (1995:30). The ultimate purpose of such language, on his account, is to facilitate 
making the different frames of reference that are being translated between show forth in their 
specificity. I will borrow his concept of ‘infra-language’ for my own purposes below. 
 In veering away from nature as unitary system and as entity that is localized in 




distinction to entail that there are natural things and there are cultural things. Rather, the 
prototype case could be that there are natural aspects and cultural aspects in the same things, 
and that in many situations any presence of the natural is also a presence of the cultural. The 
distinction could describe a border-zone or a threshold of inter-implication more than a 
separating line between two kingdoms. And yet the distinction could still be worth drawing. 
 As is also common in anthropological work, we can distinguish the categories 
informing thought of people whose lives we are seeking to understand, from the categories 
specific anthropologists wish to inform their own thought. There could be a nature/culture 
distinction in the thought of people we are in dialogue with (or a range of nature/culture 
distinctions), that is not exactly the same as a nature/culture distinction in a researcher’s 
thought. Research subjects’ judgments of what is natural or cultural should not always be 
expected to closely track researchers’ own. The relation between these levels is always 
complex. This is another sense in which ‘nature’ means many things and there are many 
nature/culture distinctions that could be differently rejected or accepted. Nor should we 
expect research subjects’ concepts to be expressed primarily in the mode of explicit single 
words or propositions. Those concepts’ more consequential life may take oblique forms and 
require very active but epistemologically problematic work of interpretive inference for an 
anthropological observer to make them out. Further, specific anthropologists’ own thought 
may be opaque to themselves: just because a researcher affirms or rejects a nature/culture 
distinction in explicit propositional discourse does not mean this overt discourse closely 
matches the researcher’s own actual practices of thinking and analysis.  
 In my remaining comments, I will consider directly only the issue of nature/culture 





 Here are at least a few distinctions that the language of ‘nature versus culture’ 
sometimes shifts across in different contexts of its use:  
 
biology; vs. culture; 
genes, hard-wiring;  nurture, socialization; 
animal;  human; 
earth, physics;  human; 
things;  humans; 
objects;  subjects; 
matter;  mind; 
raw material of matter, energy, life;  human appropriation and 
reorganization of matter, energy, life; 
extrahuman biophysical 
environment; 
 human society; 
fact;  value; 
primary qualities, things as they are  secondary qualities, things as 
experienced; 
real;  symbolic; 
transhistorically universal;  historically particular; 
necessary;  contingent; 
heteronomy, determination;  autonomy, freedom; 
processes and conditions understood 
to unfold independently of subjects’ 
intentional, mind-mediated control. 
 processes and conditions subjects are 





It is the last of these distinctions that I would propose retaining, as candidate meanings of 
‘nature’ and ‘culture’ for a comparative infra-language. This last distinction perhaps repeats 
the preceding one of ‘determination’ versus ‘freedom,’ and bears partial ties to many of the 
other distinctions. But it can be separated from presuppositions of ‘nature’ as environment, as 
a system of laws, as universal, as singular, or as unitary.  
 One could argue that determination versus freedom is specific to European 
Enlightenment thought, and not relevant to comparative knowledge. Or one could argue the 
same about an opposition between human intentional mind and what is outside the mediation 
of human intention. But there are many areas of ethnography and language where there is 
evidence of people being oriented by some kind of problematic of what can be controlled via 
the mediation of mental intention, and what is given, constraining, or presupposed from 
sources independent of human mental intention. Enlightenment ideology might promote 
peculiar understandings of ‘freedom’ that are ill-suited to understanding people’s lives in all 
times and places. But perhaps a relatively open or semantically reduced understanding of 
‘freedom’ of a different order is relevant beyond Enlightenment-shaped worlds?  
 Cross-societal phenomena of mourning are one of many possible illustrations of this. 
Death is organized variably in different social settings, and responses or non-responses to it 
are also diverse. But in many contexts, death events are a major social disruption and 
emotional trauma, and there are elaborate processes by which people adjust to those events. 
This suggests in those contexts a basic problematic of humans having something done to 
them that they do not intend, control, or fully comprehend, and they are reckoning with the 
actuality of what they did not control and intend. Phenomenon of killing, of political use and 
regulation of death, and of biomedical creation or prolongation of life complicate these 
dialectics of human autonomy and heteronomy around the life/death threshold, but do not 




 This proposal posits that all people are likely to have a reflexive understanding of 
human action as lodged in a dialectical inter-space of the given, the enabling, the constraining 
on the one hand, and the intentionally performed or mediated-by-consciousness on the other. 
Yet we can also expect the distinction between intentional control and what unfolds 
independently of human intention to map onto different areas of experience across societies 
or contexts. People change the location of this threshold or have multiple thresholds 
operating at once. And this threshold is likely to be present in most areas of life not in the 
form of there being natural things and cultural things, but in the form of there being natural or 
naturalized levels to all objects, activities, and states of being, and cultural or culturalized 
aspects to them.  
 I am thus suggesting that nature/culture could be a comparative infra-language for 
talking about people’s own cultural sensibilities about agency and its conditions, especially in 
relation to biophysical levels of being. The nature/culture distinction as understood here 
would be a heuristic path toward perceiving and thinking about people’s reflexive 
understandings about intentional control versus that which is other to such control. An idea of 
tension between what humans control and what are uncontrolled or less controlled conditions 
of their actions is a potentially helpful starting point for comparative work on variation in 
how that tension is constituted in different societies or institutional settings, and variation in 
the location of people’s understood thresholds between natural and cultural (in this specific 
sense).  
 My suggestion implies that the category ‘subject’ or ‘human’ itself is a needed infra-
language, against the current of contemporary academic post-humanism. It is likely that 
virtually all humans have concepts of ‘human,’ and that these concepts partly involve a close 
(but non-exclusive) relation of prototypy between ‘human’ and ‘intentionality’ or 




ways. Part of the point of this infra-language would be to open up to the extreme variability 
in understandings and relationalities of ‘human’ or ‘subject’ cross-societally and cross-
institutionally, while also registering that categories akin to ‘human’ or ‘subject’ are central 
to most people’s worlds, whether lexically named or only tacitly entailed in discourse and 
practice. In other words, rejecting European ‘humanism’ leads not to post-humanism, but to 
comparative inquiry into the understandings of ‘human’ or ‘subject’ and its relationalities that 
are historically particular to different people and social contexts, something the best critics of 
the nature-culture distinction have pioneered. Correlatively, ‘intentionality’ or 
‘consciousness’ are likely to be defined and distributed in all kinds of ways, in different 
systems of thought and practice. Across this variability, I am suggesting that most people are 
likely to understand ‘human’ as being centrally lodged in an ambiguous border-zone of 
intentionality and conditions independent of human intention, and that studying their theories 
and practices of the organization of such a border-zone is a core anthropological task. 
 Some critics of the nature/culture distinction retain distinctions cognate to the one I 
am making, while eschewing ‘nature’ as too badly compromised a term to be useful for 
naming one pole of the distinction.ii The nature they reject again tends to be most focally the 
Enlightenment one of a unitary hierarchical system of laws. Perhaps the more limited, 
intentionality-focused distinction should be drawn using more neutral labels, even merely 
algebraic ones like ‘A’ versus ‘B.’ Additionally, it would be possible to accept a heuristic 
nature/culture distinction without expecting A or B themselves each to be unitary. Each could 
be further subdivided, and the A/B distinction itself could be crosscut by other distinctions 
that are equally important or more important. But in the midst of those needed additional 
directions of inquiry, retaining for a little while a language of ‘nature’ versus ‘culture’ might 






The Anthropocene and the Nature/Culture Distinction: A Crisis of ‘Human’ 
The current emergence of humans—or rather, of those humans participating in the most 
energy-intensive tiers of industrial economic systems—into the status of a geophysical force 
might at first seem to weigh on the side of discarding the nature/culture distinction. For 
example, at an early moment of popular awareness of climate change some years before the 
term Anthropocene entered circulation, environmentalist and journalist Bill McKibben 
argued in The End of Nature (1989) that the human and the natural can no longer be 
distinguished, because the human has overwhelmed the natural. Crutzen, one early coiner of 
the term ‘Anthropocene,’ co-authored a more recent statement that ‘The long-held barriers 
between nature and culture are breaking down. It’s no longer us against ‘Nature.’ Instead, it’s 
we who decide what nature is and what it will be.’iii 
 But this is ‘nature’ in the popular and historically recent sense of a unitary human-
external system. What I will do briefly now is use the different nature/culture distinction I 
have proposed to try to parse cultural and historical consciousness in the Anthropocene era. I 
suggest that the Anthropocene is not only a crisis of ecological destruction, but correlatively a 
crisis and destructive reorganization of the category ‘human’ and its relationalities. It is a 
crisis of dominant understandings of human agency.  
 
Enlightenment as Destruction and Unfreedom 
The broadest pattern I wish to track is the Faustian narrative of an Enlightenment project of 
self-styled rationality and freedom that turns out to cause the destruction of our own lives. 
The project of heightened realization of culture as control turns out to lead to its opposite, an 
increased heteronomy in relation to forces humans do not entirely control (compare Boyer 




rationally understanding them. Even when humans do understand them, we are not able to act 
intentionally in changed ways in light of what we know about those forces.  
 Horkheimer and Adorno wrote in 1944 that ‘Enlightenment, understood in the widest 
sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and 
installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant 
calamity’ (2002:1). They were referring to totalitarian regimes and the fast, deliberate 
technological apocalypse of death camps and industrial warfare, but their model also fits the 
slow apocalypse of anthropogenic climate change. 
 Specifically, the Anthropocene exposes the incoherence of modern societies’ value 
commitment to economic growth, and the incoherence of their lack of social will to change 
that value commitment. Modern societies are centered on the embodied conviction that a 
good way to realize the Enlightenment value of human freedom is the increase in personal 
consumption that can be won through ever-accelerating burning of fossil fuels. But planetary 
finitude increasingly haunts this conviction about growth. It is no longer only fringe critics 
who have to at least think about the idea that growth and cheap carbon-burning leads toward 
collapse and unfreedom.   
 Additionally, the Anthropocene thematizes human mental and social self-opacity. 
Unlike processes of industrial warfare and genocide, anthropogenic climate change does not 
involve people deliberately using Enlightenment principles to destroy freedom. Instead 
destruction of freedom is unfolding largely as an uncontrolled—or at least, willfully ignored 
or denied—effect of what actors more deliberately intend. To an understanding of culture as 
consciousness-mediated control, the Anthropocene is extra-shocking. It consists of 





 In this way, the Anthropocene undermines the Enlightenment formation’s idea of 
humans as triumphantly realizing an accelerating proportion of free control over conditions 
of life. Enlightenment-heritage humans do not even control the processes of their own 
purported control. We think that in succeeding at economic growth or other modes of 
progress, we are realizing our high values of freedom, triumphing over exogenous constraint. 
Then we learn that we have entered our own Faustian trap of vast unfreedom. 
 This pattern could be described as a historical process that is repudiating the very 
same concept of ‘nature’ that Latour and others are at pains to reject, and reinstalling a 
different dialectics of human intentional control and uncontrolled processes of growth and 
destruction. Enlightenment was the myth of nature as mere objectivity and as external, 
controllable system. Enlightenment tried to claim that everything can be commensurated with 
human rationality and control, and the problem of givens and foundations can be handled by 
a nature that is an external objective unitary system. The belief and practice of that myth is at 
least slightly imploding, as culture on the extractivist model destroys the basis of its own 
existence, and we are presented with a more troubled internal relation between an exercise of 
free control and its unfree conditions.  
 
Physical and Temporal Scale: The Thought-Defying Otherness of Geological Humanity 
Another widely-remarked face of the Anthropocene’s delivery of these troubling rebuttals of 
Enlightenment ideologies of intentionality and freedom concerns the physical and temporal 
scale of what one has to think about in order to posit the Anthropocene.  
 The shock of the Anthropocene category is the shock that humans could cause 
changes to world structure on a geological scale, and humans could themselves be a 




of time in excess of intentionality. Then the Anthropocene mixes human intentionality and its 
uncontrolled, impersonal consequences right into the latest temporal phases of that vast scale.  
 This scale-collapse of the difference between human history and planetary history is 
also a new challenge of otherness for thought. It is a challenge of stabilizing how to think 
about close relations between human intentionality and scales of uncontrolled physical 
process that are too big to think on a human intentional scale. And it is a challenge to 
stabilize how to think about human intentional action’s relations to its presupposed 
conditions in less anthropocentric ways than the Enlightenment promoted.  
 Alongside those challenges of physical and temporal scale, there is the equally 
difficult idea of collective human suffering and mass death, in defiance of most people’s 
habituated understandings of growth and progress as the story of their historical position. 
Millenarianism is not a mainstream Enlightenment historical model, but ecological 
millenarianism is now a mainstream spectre. 
 
Thinking the Anthropocene and Thinking Human Social Divisions 
The last perturbation I will allude to is the Anthropocene’s intersections with human social 
divisions. Under the old nature/culture dispensation in anthropology, one brass ring was to 
work out how the natural operates as a figural field mediating constitution of human society. 
This problematic intersects with something I have barely touched on so far, namely that 
intentionality and consciousness are not either/or matters. Humans’ self-knowing in personal 
subjectivity and across social networks is ambiguous and multilayered. The nature/culture 
field I am advocating, as a distinction between what people understand to be intentionally 
controlled and what they understand to unfold independently of human intentionality, is also 
a site through which people take on or hide away forms of self-knowledge, and a site through 




is that inside what people naturalize, such as a landscape or a bodily feeling or condition, are 
many social and historical commitments. At stake in nature/culture distinctions could be 
models of intrahuman social otherness and of what a self owes to others. 
 In the present moment, the Anthropocene intersects with human social divisions in a 
variety of well-known forms. First, it raises issues of the discrepancy between who causes the 
ecological crises through massive fossil fuel burning, and who suffers its consequences 
(Chakrabarty 2009; Hornborg 2014:9; Haraway 2016). Humans are entering a relatively 
unitary planetary crisis, but like many other crises this one is created from deep divisions of 
wealth and political interest, its effects unfold differently across those divisions, and people’s 
perceptual and political responses to it are refracted through those divisions again. 
 The Anthropocene also intersects with human social divisions by highlighting 
incapacity for collective social mobilization to do anything substantial about the crisis. 
Societies are divided in views or admissions about whether the crisis exists, who needs to do 
anything about it, and what to do.  
 This is where I would circle back finally to my choice to discuss a nature/culture 
distinction relevant to comparative understanding of research subjects’ own thought: nature 
versus culture as a ‘folk’ distinction or ethnotheory, immanent to lives of people in their 
historical particularity. 
 Since the Anthropocene is an ecological crisis, one might reasonably argue that the 
first task is to assess the nature/culture distinction as it applies to understanding the crisis in 
its ecological dimensions, such as understanding humans as geophysical actors. We do not 
need a cultural analysis of the Anthropocene, centered on a model of human agency 
organizing the thought of actors. We need the actual nature/culture distinction that is 




 But the contrary hypothesis that has motivated my discussion here is that it is exactly 
the ideological commitments in people’s models of intentional, mind-mediated control and 
independently given processes that, in the first place, structure their arguments over what the 
Anthropocene is and whether it exists. And it is those models that are structuring our ongoing 
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Notes    
                                            
i I once wrote an essay on hunting symbolism that falls squarely within the terms of the 
nature/culture framework I am elaborating here (Stasch 1996). 
ii For example, Descola (2013) posits a distinction between physicality and interiority, and 
builds his fourfold typology of different ontologies of the human versus non-human field of 
relations on the universality of a physicality versus interiority split. Latour (1993) advocates 
the recognition and analysis of nature-culture hybrids, which implies a plural constitution out 
of distinguishable and mutually irreducible (as well as mutually entangled, mutually 
produced, and mutually interdependent) aspects (compare Hornborg 2009:95). Later he 
juxtaposes to the ‘collectivity’ a ‘pluriverse’ that is its ‘outside,’ comprising ‘new 
nonhumans’ that have not been brought into it (Latour 2009). Wagner  (1981[1975]) retains a 




                                                                                                                                       
while drawing attention to cross-societal variation in where these dialectical poles of 
attention and inattention or masking are located. 
iii See Paul Crutzen and Christian Schwägerl, ‘Living in the Anthropocene: Toward a New 
Global Ethos,’ 24 Jan 2011, 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/living_in_the_anthropocene_toward_a_new_global_ethos/2363/ 
(Accessed 7 November 2016). 
